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Fractal structure offers new leverage for
understanding cognition (Dixon et al.,
2012; Kelty-Stephen and Dixon, 2012,
2013). A minority in neuroscience feels
very strongly about this point, finding it
either crucial (Friston et al., 2012; Van
Orden et al., 2012) or patently absurd (e.g.,
Wagenmakers et al., 2012). The majority
remain understandably mystified or bored
by opaque math and ponderous debate. I
propose to re-present the point through
analogy to a field far removed from neu-
roscience, namely, astronomy, in the hopes
ofmaking the common threads clearer and
less threatening. One field gazes deep into
the brain; the other gazes up and away
from anything on Earth. However, both
kinds of scientists seek physicochemical
accounts of comparably high-dimensional
systems (Mesulam, 2008). They must take
imperfect measurements and use elegant
strategies to probe these measurements
for what is not plainly obvious to the
naked eye.
Fractal structure (or its absence) and
its implication in cognition grows rather
inoffensively out of spectral methods (i.e.,
“spectroscopy”) that elevated astronomy
from guesswork to extremely sophisti-
cated inquiry. The comparison of 20 years
of neuroscience exploring fractal struc-
ture in cognition (e.g., Gilden et al.,
1995) to 200 years of spectroscopy in
astronomy is humblingly instructive (see
Hearnshaw, 2010). Far from undermining
physicochemical accounts of the heavens,
since its recognition in astronomy (e.g.,
de Vaucouleurs, 1970; Mandelbrot, 1977),
fractal structure has supported physico-
chemical accounts of star formation in
ways non-fractal models could not (e.g.,
Larson, 2005). Comparing our 20 years
with astronomy’s 200, I am prepared not to
live to see the fruition of similar attempts
in neuroscience. I hope only to illustrate
that neuroscience might learn a lot from
astronomy’s cosmopolitan views of spec-
troscopy.
We forget easily that modern astron-
omy was not always the scientific suc-
cess we know today. Despite unresolved
questions, we are awash in precise physi-
cal and chemical information about 1011
stars living for billions of years in each of
2011 galaxies (Geach, 2011; Tolstoy, 2011).
Roughly 180 years ago, Comte (1835) pre-
dicted that we would never know the
physicochemical details of the heavens.
Astronomy was only as good as tele-
scopes with the strongest magnification,
and astronomy would never be more than
guesswork projected into kinematics of
these magnified dots and smears. Comte’s
words reflected an ignorance of the ini-
tial evidence from a new method called
“spectroscopy.” And it was the subsequent
development of spectroscopy that allowed
astronomers to bury Comte’s disparaging
assessment.
What Comte didn’t know about spec-
troscopy was that astronomical mea-
sures of celestial dots and smears carry
richly patterned optical information (e.g.,
Fraunhofer, 1817). The full spectrum of
electromagnetic radiation reached Earth
only incompletely. Between star and tele-
scope lay rich molecular clouds of dust
and gas. Decomposing this radiation into a
spectrum of oscillations at different scales
revealed the composition of the molec-
ular clouds because specific configura-
tions of electrons absorbed and emitted
light from specific ranges of the electro-
magnetic spectrum. For instance, Lockyer
(1869) and Janssen (1869) identified the
element later known as helium based on
its absorbing and emitting light waves
of length 587.6 nanometers—or, equiva-
lently, light waves oscillating at a frequency
of 5.1 × 1014 Hz. Specific elements com-
posing the universe absorbed energy at
specific scales of space and time. Here
was the key to the universe’s composi-
tion and to quashing Comte’s prophecy of
ignorance.
Spectroscopy denotes the broad class
of analyses depicting how an observable’s
distribution over a wide range of mea-
surement scales. Different kinds of spectra
entail different sorts of axis labels. “Power”
spectra plot oscillatory power (i.e., ampli-
tude squared) against oscillatory wave-
length or, inversely, frequency. “Energy”
and “mass” spectra plot quantity across
spatial scales. Scientists care about spec-
troscopy because, as with light through
celestial molecular clouds, the distribu-
tion of observables varies with scale, and
this relationship usually provides insights
into the processes underlying phenomena
we care about. Sometimes these processes
exhibit selective response to characteris-
tic scales, as in helium’s emission spec-
tra. Other measurements exhibit response
over a continuous range of scales, and
this response can increase or decrease
with scale. Fractal structure is nothing
but an extremely specific example of this
latter case, namely, a spectrum exhibit-
ing power-law (and thus scale-invariant)
growth or decay across scales. Here we
encounter a rather large fact that often
goes unmentioned in the debates: There
are truly no “fractal analyses”—only frac-
tal or non-fractal patterns revealed by
spectroscopic methods.
Neuroscience has a fondness for char-
acteristic scales. For instance, evoked
response potential (ERP) data suggests
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that cortical activity exhibits different volt-
age profiles across time depending on the
engagement of separate neural/cognitive
mechanisms. A peak of negative volt-
age at 400ms (i.e., the “N400”) after
visual presentation of a letter string indi-
cates recognition that the letter string is
pronounceable (e.g., Rossi et al., 2011).
Whereas absorption/emission of light at
5.1 × 1014 Hz was the astronomers’ first
glimpse of helium, perhaps N400s at
(400ms−1=) 2.5Hz is a glimpse of a sim-
ilarly elemental mechanism in cognitive
processes. However, neuroscience focuses
its spectroscopic strategies on molecu-
lar details of blood flow and metabolites
(Minati et al., 2007; Murkin and Arango,
2009). However, these molecular details
alone don’t address flexible, task-sensitive
operation of cognitive processes of lan-
guage comprehension (White et al., 2012).
So long as these mechanisms are known by
their characteristic time scales, why hasn’t
neuroscience situated the N400 on a spec-
trum too?
One obstacle is that spectroscopy needs
long, densely sampled time series. Any sin-
gle stream of ERP data is so noisy that
observing N400s in single-participant data
requires averaging over at least 45 trials
(e.g., Niedeggen et al., 1999). Otherwise,
we might collect prolonged series of ERP
data of a participant viewing continu-
ous text of pronounceable letter strings.
Reading pace is ∼250ms/word (Rayner
and Clifton, 2009). Let us imagine the
resulting ERP signal: N400 peaks for each
string, spaced 250ms apart over time.
The emission line in power-spectral anal-
ysis of this ERP signal would appear
at (250ms−1=) 4Hz. Dyslexic readers
take 500ms/word longer (Russeler et al.,
2007), and their N400 peaks might be
spaced by (250 + 500=) 750ms, produc-
ing a peak in a spectrum of ERP data
at (750ms−1=) 1.33Hz. Just as a peak
voltage at 400ms might signify a phono-
tactic mechanism’s characteristic scale, the
gap between 1.33 and 4Hz should indi-
cate the difference in reading mechanisms
between dyslexic and typical readers. After
all, wasn’t it a similar spectral differ-
ence that helped astronomers distinguish
helium from sodium?
Results from reading reaction times tell
a different story. Over the course of read-
ing a 14000-word story, reading time per
word decrease according to Newell and
Rosenbloom’s (1981) ubiquitous power-
law of learning (Wallot et al., 2013). Also,
rather than looking at the power spec-
trum of ERP signals, we might examine
the power spectrum of trial-by-trial read-
ing times. Whereas our above ERP series
are imaginary, the latter power spectra
have been empirically recorded and pre-
sented many times over (e.g., Van Orden
et al., 2003; Holden et al., 2009; Wallot
and Van Orden, 2011). These spectra show
that fluctuations in reading-time series
resemble 1/f noise, an inverse power-
law relationship between oscillatory power
and frequency. Rather than having cleanly
individuated peaks like emission spectra,
the power spectra from these reading-time
series show a continuous slow decrease
in oscillatory power with greater frequen-
cies. Rather than individuated peaks (i.e.,
characteristic time scales), these spectra
show similar decreases in power across
all scales. Often hotly contested as sta-
tistical artifacts of “simpler” behavior of
cognitive processes at characteristic scales,
these patterns have survived statistical rig-
ors (Delignières and Marmelat, 2012).
Statistical rigor notwithstanding, ori-
gins and relevance of fractal patterns in
neuroscience remain as hotly contested.
My own view aligns with one expressed
in astronomical literature: fractal patterns
reflect cascade dynamics both supported
by and giving rise to structures at many
scales (Larson, 2005). Astronomy and neu-
roscience alike have grappled with the
realization that structures must some-
how embody stability but also flexibility.
Stars are not static, homogeneous objects
distinct from their contexts—no matter
the convenience of this notion for brief
measurement and modeling. Stars con-
dense out of clouds, undergo developmen-
tal phases, and collapse or explode, and
so on. Structures exhibiting characteristic
scales demand reconciliation with the frac-
tal patterns inherited from the Big Bang
(Mohaved et al., 2011). Similarly, inde-
pendent mechanisms underpinning cog-
nition are no more static or distinct.
Brain structures and cognitive structures
reflect relatively stable configurations of
neural dynamics within contexts struc-
tured at multiple scales (Buzaki, 2006).
They exhibit relatively stable short-range
functions, but this stability is relative
to longer-term variation across the time
scales of learning, the life span, and
species evolution. The hierarchical nesting
of these multiple scales engenders cascades
giving rise to structure, and these cascades
are no less valid a factor in a physicochem-
ical account than electron configurations.
In this light, fractal results that can be
(rigorously!) demonstrated to reflect cas-
cade dynamics support a physicochemical
account of structure, in astronomy and
neuroscience alike.
Spectroscopic work relating fractal pat-
terns to changes in the organization of
observed structures supports the forego-
ing proposals. Fractal modeling of cloud
dispersion predicts galactic emission spec-
tra (Bottorff and Ferland, 2001) as well as
temperature changes associated with star
formation (Pan and Padoan, 2009). In cog-
nitive tasks, bodily movements (e.g., of
eye-gaze, hand, foot, or posture) incident
to exploring task environments exhibit
fractal power spectra. These power-law
exponents describing these spectra serve
to predict the flexibility of cognitive per-
formance in the same tasks. That is,
fractal fluctuations in the human body
support the ability of cognitive systems
to fine-tune their perceptual judgments
(Stephen and Hajnal, 2011; Palatinus et al.,
2013) or to discover new representa-
tions of problem-solving tasks (Stephen
and Dixon, 2009; Stephen et al., 2009).
Moreover, these effects of fractal pattern-
ing in exploratory behaviors may pre-
dict individual-trial performance above
and beyond average differences in reac-
tion times due to traditional cognitive pro-
cesses (Stephen and Anastas, 2011).
The central appeal of fractal results in
cognition and neuroscience, to my view,
is that they may offer us a framework
for aligning physicochemical accounts of
neural, cognitive phenomena with physic-
ochemical accounts pursued in differ-
ent domains. Reaching for a relatively
more generic physicochemical framework
in which insights from different domains
might be mutually relevant and compati-
ble interests me. Not only that, it strikes
me as an ideal way of grounding our
tests of physicochemical guesses for neu-
roscience upon stronger physicochemi-
cal foundations. Evidence of fractality in
domains beyond cognition and neuro-
science is a reason that neuroscientists cite
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for being unimpressed: for instance, the
fact that many more systems are found to
exhibit fractal fluctuations than are agreed
upon to be “cognitive” is taken to entail
that fractality is not important to cogni-
tion (Botvinick, 2012). This logic seems
to presume that welcome causal players
in cognitive theory include only those
that maintain the (pre-theoretical) distinc-
tion between cognitive systems and non-
cognitive ones. Cognitive neuroscience
sometimes takes great comfort in assert-
ing the fundamental difference of cogni-
tive systems from all others (Wagenmakers
et al., 2012).
Perhaps similarity between cog-
nitive neuroscience and other
physicochemically-oriented fields is
unwelcome. I find declaring one’s own
scientific field to require special and dif-
ferent explanation from other scientific
fields no more compelling than Comte
(1835) found pre-spectroscopic astron-
omy’s guesswork at dots and smears in
telescope images. We already have one
Big Bang from which to weave cosmo-
logical history, and the simple assertion
that cognitive systems are fundamentally
different from everything else post-Big
Bang will require another. Any such
cognitive Big Bang (e.g., “when some-
thing might have had the first thought”)
seems less like compelling explanation
and more like reluctance to face what may
be humbling physicochemical realities. I
remain cautiously confident that spec-
troscopy should be as valuable to cognitive
neuroscience as it has been to astron-
omy in discerning common explanatory
ground with other physicochemical
disciplines.
Fractal and non-fractal results from
spectroscopy appear important to me
because they make falsifiable the inter-
esting physicochemical hypothesis that
development of structure in nervous sys-
tems depends on cascades. When this
hypothesis fails to be interesting, I will
oblige my critics and stop worrying about
fractals.
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